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INTRODUCTION 
Sexual harassment in the workplace became legally actionable in the late 1970s, 
when quid pro quo harassment was first held to be “sex discrimination within the meaning 
of Title VII.”1 Since the 1970s, the legal doctrine of sexual harassment has continuously 
developed, responding in part to rapid technological changes that have helped to reshape 
the workplace.2 A newly emerging company policy called “Bring Your Own Device” 
(BYOD), where employees use personal devices for work rather than using company-
supplied technology (for example, personal cell phones),3 is another such change that will 
continue to reshape the workplace. Although BYOD policies exist at the intersection of 
several major tensions in workplace sexual harassment, the impact that these policies will 
have on sexual harassment claims is unclear.  
This Note discusses the legal challenges that arise with BYOD policies in the 
workplace in relation to sexual harassment claims and employer liability. Part I gives a brief 
background to the legal development of workplace sexual harassment claims. Part II 
discusses the general impact of technology on workplace sexual harassment. Part III 
discusses the rise of BYOD policies and examines the legal challenges that these policies 
pose when traditional sexual harassment law is applied to cases of sexual harassment 
involving these policies. Finally, Part IV explores several different options, both in addition 
to and instead of traditional sexual harassment law, which could be used for dealing with 
                                                          
1  Lucetta Pope, Everything You Ever Wanted to Know About Sexual Harassment But Were Too Politically Correct to Ask 
(Or, the Use and Abuse of “But For” Analysis in Sexual Harassment Law Under Title VII), 30 SW. U. L. REV. 253, 272 
(2001). See infra Part I for a definition of “quid pro quo” and an in-depth discussion of the development of sexual-
harassment law. 
2  Jeremy Gelms, Comment, High-Tech Harassment: Employer Liability Under Title VII for Employee Social Media 
Misconduct, 87 WASH. L. REV. 249, 249 (2012). 
3  Hope A. Comisky & Tracey E. Diamond, The Risks and Rewards of a BYOD Program: Ensuring Corporate Compliance 
Without Causing “Bring Your Own Disaster” at Work, 8 CHARLESTON L. REV. 385, 387 (2014). 
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sexual harassment claims. Ultimately, this Note recommends that Congress provide federal 
statutes that clarify the problems with workplace sexual harassment law, particularly in the 
areas identified in this paper: location, electronic employee monitoring, and First 
Amendment issues.  
Perpetrators of sexual harassment should not be able to exploit loopholes in Title 
VII sexual harassment law to get away with sexually harassing those with whom they work. 
Yet, with the current state of the law, this may be exactly what would happen. Resolving 
those problems through federal statutes, as advised by this Note, would allow courts to deal 
with BYOD policies and workplace sexual harassment in a uniform manner that recognizes 
the unique characteristics of BYOD devices and still provides remedies to victims. Without 
these statutes, the liability of employers for harassment on BYOD devices will remain 
unclear, which may leave victims without protection from their employers and without a 
remedy from the court.  
 
I.  THE BASICS OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT 
 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it “an unlawful employment practice 
for an employer . . . to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, 
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin.”4 The lower federal courts first found sexual harassment 
actionable under Title VII during the late 1970s5 under the theory that it was sex 
discrimination.6 The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the federal 
executive agency that enforces prohibitions against job discrimination,7 created rules 
prohibiting workplace sexual harassment in 1980.8 Six years later, the Supreme Court found 
that sexual harassment in the workplace was a “viable legal claim” protected by Title VII, 
in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).9  
In Meritor, the Supreme Court recognized two forms of actionable sexual 
harassment: quid pro quo and hostile work environment.10 First, quid pro quo harassment 
is “sexual extortion” in which sex acts are proposed in exchange for a “tangible job benefit.”11 
                                                          
4  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012) (emphasis added). For an updated explanation of the current state of Title VII 
protections, which have been amended by various subsequent legislative acts, see Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/statutes/titlevii.cfm (last visited Oct. 14, 
2014). 
5  Glendora C. Hughes, Sexual Harassment: Then and Now, 33 MD. B.J. May-June 2000, at 27, 27 (discussing Williams v. 
Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654 (D.D.C. 1976) and Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.D.C. 1977)). 
6  Anita Bernstein, Law, Culture, and Harassment, 142 PA. L. REV. 1227, 1243 (1994). 
7  Overview, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/index.cfm (last visited Oct. 14, 
2014). 
8  Bernstein, supra note 6, at 1235. 
9  Michele Ann Higgins, Note, Blakey v. Continental Airlines, Inc.: Sexual Harassment in the New Millennium, 23 
WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 155, 160 (2002). 
10  Id. 
11  Pope, supra note 1, at 257. 
Indiana Journal of Law & Social Equality  Volume 4, Issue 2 
195 
These cases are generally only actionable if there is a tangible harm, rather than “mere 
threats of retaliation.”12 Second, hostile work environment sexual harassment exists if an 
employee is subjected to “unwelcome verbal or physical sexual behavior that is either 
severe or pervasive.”13 Physical sexual conduct is interpreted broadly enough to include 
“visual signs and pornography.”14 “Unwelcome” has been interpreted to mean that the 
conduct is “neither solicited nor incited” and is viewed as “undesirable or offensive.”15 In a 
lawsuit for hostile work environment claims, the plaintiff has the burden of proving sexual 
harassment by a preponderance of the evidence.16 Courts either use a reasonableness 
standard17 or look at the totality of the circumstances18 when determining whether the 
conduct was both sexual and unwelcome. 
Even though sexual harassment occurs between individuals, Title VII does not 
“create a cause of action against the harasser”;19 instead, plaintiffs seek compensation from 
the liable employer.20 In both Ellerth21 and Faragher,22 the Supreme Court held that “an 
employer is vicariously liable for a hostile work environment created by a supervisor.”23 In 
relying on this framework, the Court made the distinction between quid pro quo and 
hostile environment cases less critical for establishing employer liability, explaining that 
while the terms were still helpful in discussing the situation, they “should no longer define 
employer responsibility.”24 The reason behind changing the framework was primarily to 
prevent plaintiffs from stretching the definition of quid pro quo harassment to cover their 
claim so that the employer would automatically have vicarious liability.25 After these 
decisions, employers are strictly liable for quid pro quo harassment if there is a “tangible 
job detriment,” regardless of whether they knew about the harassment.26 Employers are 
also vicariously liable if there is a hostile work environment because of a supervisor. 
However, if a co-worker engaged in the harassment, then the employer is only liable if she 
                                                          
12  Id. 
13  Higgins, supra note 9. 
14  George Noël Lawrence, What Everyone Should Know About Sexual Harassment, but Was Afraid to Ask, 60 TEX. B.J. 
1024, 1027 (1997). 
15  Id. 
16  Id. 
17  Anita Bernstein, Treating Sexual Harassment with Respect, 111 HARV. L. REV. 445, 446 (1997). 
18  Lawrence, supra note 14, at 1027. 
19  Debra D. Burke, Workplace Harassment: A Proposal for a Bright Line Test Consistent with the First Amendment, 21 
HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 591, 598 (2004). 
20  Bernstein, supra note 17, at 492. 
21  Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998). 
22  Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998). 
23  Gerald L. Miller, What the General Practitioner Needs to Know to Recognize Sexual Harassment Claims, 62 ALA. LAW. 
247, 248 (2001). 
24  Burke, supra note 19, at 599–600. 
25  See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 753. 
26  Jason L. Gunter & Tammie L. Rattray, Recent Developments in Employer Liability for Sexual Harassment, 72 FLA. B.J. 
94 (1998). 
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knew or should have known about the harassment and did not take prompt, appropriate 
action to stop the harassment.27 
The Ellerth and Faragher cases also provided employers with an affirmative defense 
if the employer “exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually 
harassing behavior,” and if the employee “unreasonably failed to take advantage of any 
preventative or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm 
otherwise.”28 This affirmative defense is not available in supervisor-sexual-harassment 
cases where an actual adverse official act was taken; for example, if an employee was fired 
or demoted for failing to comply with sexual demands.29 For co-worker harassment, an 
employer can defend a claim by showing that she took immediate and appropriate 
corrective action.30 
The state of sexual-harassment litigation is not without criticism. Noting that sexual 
harassment is the only “subcategory of American federal antidiscrimination law” that 
requires the victim to prove it was subjectively “distasteful,” some scholars have argued that 
sexual-harassment law does not fit under Title VII.31 Similarly, other authors have argued 
that the confusion between “sexual traits and sex” in sexual harassment suits “creeps 
beyond Title VII’s bounds.”32 Specifically, one scholar argued that the courts conflate sexual 
traits (things that occur usually in either males or females), with the actual category of sex 
(being either male or female), and so define sex incorrectly during a sexual-harassment 
analysis by “equating sexual attraction and discriminatory intent.”33 In other words, she 
argues that there is a causation issue with whether someone is being treated differently 
because of sexual attraction or because she belongs to a protected group.34 
Other scholars have argued that the courts should create a common-law tort of 
sexual harassment35 or that sexual harassment should be regulated through the 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration.36 Additionally, some argue that the 
reasonableness standard, or that of a “rational woman,” should be replaced with a 
“respectful person” standard.37 The rationale is that sexual harassment is an act of 
                                                          
27  Id. The authors also note that there may be a rare case where an employee’s harassing actions are within the scope 
of employment (for example, if the employer wants fewer women workers and the harassment aids that goal); if that 
is the case, the employer is vicariously liable. 
28  Miller, supra note 23, at 248. 
29  Id. 
30  Burke, supra note 19, at 599. 
31  Bernstein, supra note 6, at 1250. 
32  Pope, supra note 1, at 254.  
33  Id. at 255. 
34  Id. at 271. 
35  Rosa Ehrenreich, Dignity and Discrimination: Toward a Pluralistic Understanding of Workplace Harassment, 88 GEO. 
L.J. 1, 61 (1999); Bernstein, supra note 6, at 1249. 
36  Bernstein, supra note 6, at 1292. 
37  Bernstein, supra note 17, at 450 (“[H]ostile environment complaints should refer to respect; the plaintiff should be 
required to prove that the defendant—a man, or a woman, or a business entity—did not conform to the standard of 
a respectful person.”). 
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“disrespect” and so the second standard more closely aligns with what is actually 
occurring.38 It is also a gender-neutral standard, one that focuses on the “conduct of an 
actor rather than the reaction of the complainant.”39  
 Given all of these criticisms, it is clear that sexual-harassment law is not perfect. 
These imperfections become clearer when the limits of sexual-harassment law are probed 
with a hypothetical case involving a BYOD device. Those imperfections may leave victims 
of sexual harassment without a remedy. However, these criticisms also offer potential 
solutions to the problems identified in this paper, as discussed in Part IV of this Note. 
It is important to recognize that workplace sexual-harassment claims under Title 
VII grew out of the 1970s feminist movement, though they have since evolved from those 
beginnings.40 Beginning with the inception of the term “sexual harassment,” scholars have 
focused on women as the subordinates at work who bear the brunt of this type of 
harassment.41 However, newly-emerging literature on sexual-harassment claims recognizes 
the variety of ways that sexual harassment can actually occur:  
 
Actionable harassment now includes, for example, a gay supervisor’s demotion of a gay or 
straight male employee based on rejected (or accepted) sexual advances, a female 
supervisor’s demotion of a male employee for the same reasons, as well as the comparable 
demotion by a lesbian female supervisor of a female employee. Similarly, sexual harassment 
does or will include sexual advances towards co-workers (or supervisees), or hostile 
behavior towards co-workers (or supervisees) who have rejected advances, in all the above 
combinations.42 
 
II. TECHNOLOGY’S IMPACT ON SEXUAL HARASSMENT 
 The original legal concept of sexual harassment at work arose in a world that did 
not yet have some of the technological devices and tools that are integral to a workplace 
today: Internet, smart phones, laptops, emails, and text messaging.43 But as workplaces 
benefit by incorporating new technologies, sexual harassers in employment are also able to 
take advantage of these new technologies.44 Three problems arise when technology is used 
to sexually harass someone at work: (1) the harassment does not always take place at work; 
(2) employers’ monitoring of their employees’ online activities is controversial; and (3) 
                                                          
38  Id. 
39  Id. at 455. 
40  See Pope, supra note 1, at 259. 
41  Katherine Roush, Let’s Talk About Sex Discrimination: The Tenth Circuit’s Decision in Dick v. Phone Directories Co., 
83 DENV. U.L. REV. 719, 721–22 (2006). 
42  Pope, supra note 1, at 262. This Note focuses on victims of workplace sexual harassment generally, without 
differentiating the gender of either the harasser or the victim, as this issue is not the focus of this Note. For a 
discussion on same-sex harassment, see, for example, William C. Sung, Taking the Fight Back to Title VII: A Case for 
Redefining “Because of Sex” to Include Gender Stereotypes, Sexual Orientation, and Gender Identity, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 
487 (2011). 
43  See Higgins, supra note 9. 
44  Id. at 155. 
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employers’ efforts to minimize liability for sexual harassment possibly infringe upon the 
First Amendment right to free speech. Part II provides a brief summary of each of these 
issues, which will provide the basis for analyzing a putative claim involving BYOD devices, 
discussed in Part III. 
 
A. The Location Issue 
When sexual-harassment lawsuits began, employers only owed a duty to employees 
within the “physical environment of the workplace.”45 Since then, liability has been 
extended to include harassment that occurs outside of the physical workplace.46 
Specifically, some out-of-office activities like “meetings, business trips, and employer-
sponsored social events” can be considered under the “totality of the circumstances” 
standard used to evaluate sexual-harassment claims because they are an “extension” of the 
workplace.47 
But new technological developments, like the Internet and devices that can 
constantly access the Internet, have even further obliterated the boundaries of the 
traditional workplace. These technological developments make it difficult to determine 
“when an employee is on duty,” and they complicate the analysis of whether behavior that 
occurs out of the office contributes to sexual harassment.48 Unfortunately, Title VII and its 
legislative history do not address the boundaries of the workplace issue, leaving it to the 
courts.49  
However, the courts have not come to a clear determination on this issue. The 
Supreme Court has not yet addressed the location issue and circuit courts have come down 
differently on the issue of whether non-workplace behavior matters in lawsuits on sexual 
harassment. The Fifth Circuit, for example, held that evidence of non-workplace conduct 
can “help determine the severity and pervasiveness of hostility in the workplace.”50 
Similarly, the Seventh Circuit held that harassment that occurs outside of work is 
actionable, as long as there are “consequences in the workplace.”51 In contrast, the Sixth 
Circuit has said that an employer is “[generally] not liable for the harassment or other 
unlawful conduct perpetrated by a non-supervisory employee after work hours and away 
from the workplace setting.”52 But the Sixth Circuit has also said that it would be reasonable 
                                                          
45  Id. at 162. 
46  Id. 
47  Gelms, supra note 2, at 269. 
48  Megan Shuba Glowacki, Comment, On the Job and Off: Why Evidence of a Hostile Work Environment Should Never 
Clock Out, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 351, 360 (2009). 
49  Douglas R. Garmager, Note, Discrimination Outside of the Office: Where to Draw the Walls of the Workplace for a 
“Hostile Work Environment” Claim Under Title VII, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1075, 1077 (2010). 
50  Glowacki, supra note 48, at 358. 
51  Garmager, supra note 49, at 1076. 
52  Glowacki, supra note 48, at 359 (citing Duggins v. Steak n’ Shake, Inc., 3 F. App’x 302, 311 (6th Cir. 2001)). 
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for an employee to subjectively feel that a workplace is hostile if “forced to work for, or in 
close proximity to, someone who is harassing her outside the workplace.”53 
The EEOC likewise provides little guidance on how to handle these new 
technological developments affecting the harassment in the workplace. In a page on its 
website entitled “Prohibited Employment Policies/Practices,” the EEOC notes that 
“[h]arassment outside of the workplace may also be illegal if there is a link with the 
workplace.”54 But there is no corresponding regulation that explains what constitutes a 
satisfactory “link”; nor is there clarifying information available on the website.55 
Additionally, the example given is physical harassment (an employer driving an employee 
to a meeting), so it is unclear from EEOC regulations if harassment occurring in the virtual 
world is a strong enough link to the workplace to be illegal under Title VII.56 This is 
problematic for victims of electronic harassment because employers, if not legally liable, 
are not incentivized to provide protections to employees or internal remedies, leaving 
victims without either legal or workplace remedy against sexual harassment. 
 
B. Electronic Employee Monitoring Issues 
Technology has not only impacted the ability of people to harass those they work 
with but it has also enabled employers to monitor their employees’ electronic actions. 
Employers monitor their employees for a variety of reasons: to protect trade secrets and 
confidential information and to make sure that employees are not engaging in 
inappropriate behavior, harassment included.57 Common ways to monitor employees 
include “access panels, filters and firewalls, and [the] monitoring of social network and 
search engine usage.”58 The majority of employers use at least some form of electronic 
monitoring,59 and it is estimated that “more than three-quarters of major U.S. corporations 
record and review employee communications and activities on the job, including telephone 
calls, e-mail, internet communications, and computer files.”60 
Monitoring employees relates to sexual harassment primarily for the implications it 
has in an employer’s awareness of harassment. David Garrie notes that employers cannot 
physically observe everything their employees do during a workday, but that employers can 
“actively monitor” behavior online.61 Garrie argues that this ability to monitor employees 
                                                          
53  Id.  
54  Prohibited Employment Policies/Practices, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, http://www. 
c.gov/laws/practices (last visited Oct. 14, 2014).  
55  Id. 
56  Id. 
57  Comisky & Diamond, supra note 3, at 401. 
58  Corey A. Ciocchetti, The Eavesdropping Employer: A Twenty-First Century Framework for Employee Monitoring, 48 
AM. BUS. L.J. 285, 301–02 (2011). 
59  Id. at 286. 
60  Daniel B. Garrie, Limiting the Affirmative Defense in the Digital Workplace, 19 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 229, 242 (2012). 
61  Id. at 231. 
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electronically should limit an employer’s ability to use the Ellerth and Faragher affirmative 
defense.62 He says that the courts should take into consideration the “size and scope” of a 
company’s “technological infrastructure” and the affirmative defense should only be 
available if the company lacked the ability to monitor employees’ behavior.63 Garrie argues 
that because employers have the ability to monitor their employees, those employers 
should “bear the burden” to protect employees from sexual harassment.64 
But monitoring comes with a high cost to employees: the lack of privacy. Employees 
have no expectation of privacy if the employer owns the computer, if the employee accessed 
information through the employer’s network, or if the employer specifically tells its 
employees that there is no expectation of privacy (for example, tells them of monitoring 
policies).65 The general principle is that “employees have no reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the presence of an employer monitoring policy.”66 Indeed, the Supreme Court 
has created a “perverse incentive”67 for stringent employee monitoring because, under the 
standard in Ortega, workplace searches are limited by the “operational realities of the 
workplace.”68 This means that actual practices may give employees an expectation of 
privacy that employers cannot then intrude upon. 69 It is therefore in employers’ best 
interests to constantly monitor, with employees’ knowledge, so as to enable further future 
monitoring. While this is helpful in preventing sexual harassment, or rectifying it once it 
has been discovered, it does come at a high cost to employee privacy. 
Employees are not without protection from invasions into their privacy, but those 
protections are piecemeal. There is no “comprehensive statutory scheme” that protects 
employees’ privacy or governs electronic monitoring.70 At the federal level, there are two 
acts that may apply. The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) “makes it a criminal 
offense to gain unauthorized access to an individual’s computer and permits the recovery 
of civil damages when the unauthorized access results in damage exceeding $5,000.”71 The 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA) has two titles that are also relevant 
to electronic monitoring.72 First, the Wiretap Act “regulates intentional interception, use, 
                                                          
62  Id.at 248–49. 
63  Id. at 232. 
64  Id. at 247. 
65  Amanda J. Lavis, Note, Employers Cannot Get the Message: Text Messaging and Employee Privacy, 54 VILL. L. REV. 513, 
534 (2009). 
66  Id. at 533. 
67  Justin Conforti, Comment, Somebody’s Watching Me: Workplace Privacy Interests, Technology Surveillance, and the 
Ninth Circuit’s Misapplication of the Ortega Test in Quon v. Arch Wireless, 5 SETON HALL CIR. REV. 461, 486 (2009). 
68  Marissa A. Lalli, Note, Spicy Little Conversations: Technology in the Workplace and a Call for a New Cross-Doctrinal 
Jurisprudence, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 243 (2011) (citing O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987)). 
69  See id. at 245. 
70  Garrie, supra note 60, at 245 n.94. 
71  Comisky & Diamond, supra note 3, at 401. 
72  Ciocchetti, supra note 58, at 292. 
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or disclosure of wire, oral, and electronic communications.”73 Second, the Stored 
Communications Act (SCA) “governs electronic communications already transmitted and 
currently in storage.”74 However, scholars have argued that the ECPA is “essentially 
meaningless in today’s workplace environment” because “technology has advanced to the 
point where almost no transmissions are covered by the statute.”75 At the state level, there 
are also some laws that provide protection.76  
 
C.  The First Amendment Issue 
Related to the privacy issues raised by electronically monitoring employees, sexual- 
harassment litigation also raises First Amendment issues regarding the restriction of the 
right of free speech. Employees may feel or believe their private e-mails or text messages 
should be protected under the First Amendment.77 Some have argued that employers will 
“suppress protected expression” to prevent Title VII liability, which will have a “chilling 
effect” on free speech.78  
But the First Amendment provides only “limited protection against speech 
restrictions” in the workplace.79 First Amendment protection extends only to public 
employees,80 and even those employees are only protected if they speak on matters of 
public concern, subject to a balancing test.81 Currently, private employers can also restrict 
off-duty speech, if they can “prove a legitimate business interest in regulating their 
employee’s off-duty conduct.”82 In addition, scholars have noted that sexual harassment is 
an act, not speech, and as such, deserves no protection under the First Amendment.83 As 
long as “‘speech’ and ‘nonspeech’ elements are combined in the same course of conduct,” 
it appears that there is no First Amendment problem with employers restricting employees’ 
                                                          
73  Id. 
74  Id. at 293. 
75  Id. at 293–94. 
76  Comisky & Diamond, supra note 3, at 401. See also Garrie, supra note 60, at 245 n.94 (citing Ariana R. Levinson, 
Industrial Justice: Privacy Protection for the Employed, 18 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 609, 620–21 (2009)). Examples 
include laws restricting employers from asking prospective and current employees for password-protected 
information on personal social media accounts or laws requiring employers to give notice or obtain permission for 
monitoring. In Stengart v. Loving Care Agency, Inc., 990 A.2d 650 (N.J. 2010), the New Jersey Supreme Court held an 
employer liable when it inappropriately accessed information from employee e-mail. So these state laws do provide 
some employee protection. 
77  Higgins, supra note 9, at 167. 
78  Burke, supra note 19, at 612–13. 
79  Patricia Sánchez Abril, Avner Levin, & Alissa Del Riego, Blurred Boundaries: Social Media Privacy and the Twenty-
First-Century Employee, 49 AM. BUS. L.J. 63, 90 (2012). 
80  Amy Horton, Comment, Of Supervision, Centerfolds, and Censorship: Sexual Harassment, the First Amendment, and 
the Contours of Title VII, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 403, 419 (1991). 
81  Abril et al., supra note 79, at 91. 
82  Id. at 94–95 (discussing how the lack of statutes governing the intersection between social media and work means 
that U.S. employers can legally fire employees for information posted on social media sites, even while off-duty). 
83  See David K. McGraw, Sexual Harassment in Cyberspace: The Problem of Unwanted E-mail, 21 RUTGERS COMPUTER & 
TECH. L.J. 491 (1995). 
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ability to say what they want, whether or not it occurs during work.84 Therefore, this is 
generally an issue that may seem like a bigger challenge than it legally would be. 
 
III. BRING YOUR OWN DEVICE POLICIES 
 
A. The Basics of a BYOD Policy  
“Bring Your Own Device” (BYOD) policies allow employees to use their own 
personal devices for work.85 These policies do two things: they decrease technology costs 
to employers and keep employees happy.86 These benefits have employers rapidly 
switching to BYOD programs. Up to “fifty-three percent of employees are using their own 
technology for work purposes,”87 while “thirty-eight percent of chief information officers 
told Gartner [a technology research and advisory firm] that their organizations will stop 
providing company-issued laptops, smartphones, and tablets to workers by 2016.”88  
The proliferation of this policy has led some practitioners to publish articles that 
both highlight some potential legal problems that may occur under this type of policy and 
give some general advice on implementing such a policy.89 But there has yet to be a full 
academic discussion of the impact BYOD policies will have on the landscape of sexual-
harassment cases, which is the gap that this Note begins to address. The few academic 
articles that discuss BYOD policies have focused primarily on the policies connection to 
electronic monitoring, as well as how to draft a successful BYOD policy that would make 
sure employees are aware of the conditions of participating in the program.90 Some of these 
articles recommend that employers inform employees that use of personal devices must 
comply with harassment policies,91 but not all of them do.92 
The only academic article that does briefly mention harassment in relation to BYOD 
devices assumes that there would be employer liability for harassment that occurs while 
                                                          
84  Burke, supra note 19 (citing United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968)). See this source for a more detailed 
explanation of the First Amendment complexities in sexual-harassment cases. 
85  See Dave Zielinski, Bring Your Own Device, HRMAGAZINE, Feb 2012, http://www.questia.com/magazine/1P3-
2581316401/bring-your-own-device. 
86  Comisky & Diamond, supra note 3, at 386. 
87  Id. 
88  Yaron Dori & Jeff Kosseff, Employers Must Obtain Employee Consent for BYOD Programs, LAW360 (May 24, 2013, 11:12 
AM EST), http://www.law360.com/articles/444702/employers-must-obtain-employee-consent-for-byod-programs. 
89  See, e.g., John Chapas, Don’t Ignore the Risks of BYOD Programs, LAW360 (Feb. 20, 2013, 12:06 PM EST), 
http://www.law360.com/articles/409944/don-t-ignore-the-risks-of-byod-programs; Philip Gordon, 5 Lessons for 
Employers From California v. Riley, LITTLER MENDELSON  (July 10, 2014), https://www.littler.com/five-lessons-
employers-california-v-riley; Damian LaPlaca, The Legal Challenges of ‘Bring Your Own Device’, LAW360 (Jan. 8, 2013, 
12:06 PM EST), http://www.law360.com/articles/402551/the-legal-challenges-of-bring-your-own-device; Dori & 
Kosseff, supra note 88. 
90  See Comisky & Diamond, supra note 3. 
91  See, e.g., id. at 391 (“Employers must ensure that their existing policies extend to inappropriate communications on 
employee-owned devices and properly train employees on acceptable standards of conduct.”). 
92  See, e.g., Chapas, supra note 89; LaPlaca, supra note 89 (focusing on security and employee privacy). 
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using a BYOD device.93 This assumption is made without exploring the unique aspects of 
digital sexual harassment and BYOD devices and so does not explore whether the law is 
suited for a BYOD claim. 
To understand likely outcomes of sexual-harassment cases involving BYOD devices, 
this Note will first look at some cases involving digital workplace sexual harassment. “Few 
cases have addressed employer liability” for “digital workplace sexual harassment.”94 Those 
cases did not involve BYOD devices. One case held that rampant, “unchecked” offensive e-
mails going around a workplace could be sexual harassment, but a single instance of an 
offensive e-mail was not enough to constitute a claim.95 In another, e-mails from 
supervisors, in combination with non-digital comments, were considered relevant in 
considering a claim of sexual harassment.96 Finally, the New Jersey Supreme Court 
recognized a claim of sexual harassment for material posted on an electronic bulletin 
board.97 
The first case involving BYOD devices and sexual harassment will look very different 
from the facts of these three cases because of the issues discussed in Part II. Each issue will 
be discussed below. 
 
B.  The Legal Challenges of a BYOD Policy Under Traditional Sexual Harassment Law 
 
1.  The Location Problem 
First, BYOD devices are paid for by the employee and double as that employee’s 
work and personal device.98 Consider an employee who works forty hours a week and has 
a BYOD smartphone that she takes with her everywhere. Even if that employee sleeps eight 
hours a night, that still leaves seventy hours—a majority of the week—when the employee 
is carrying and using that phone as a personal device, off-site. This creates a situation where 
harassment of a co-worker or a supervisee could occur almost entirely from home, on a 
personal device. This stands in contrast to the cases where e-mails have come from 
employees on work computers, at work.99 
Given the circuit split on the issue of employer liability for off-site harassment, 
consider the following situation: harassing texts or e-mails are sent from one employee’s 
BYOD smartphone to another, only during non-work hours, from non-work places, and 
                                                          
93  Comisky & Diamond, supra note 3, at 387 (“One of the risks associated with BYOD is that employees will use their 
own devices to communicate in an inappropriate manner, leading to employer liability.”). 
94  Garrie, supra note 60, at 238. 
95  Id. (discussing Owens v. Morgan Stanley & Co., No. 96 CIV. 9747, 1997 WL 403454, at 2 (S.D.N.Y. July 17, 1997)). 
96  Id. at 238–39 (discussing Strauss v. Microsoft Corp., 91 CIV. 5928, 1995 WL 326492, at 4–5 (S.D.N.Y. June 1, 1995)). 
97  Id. at 239 (discussing Blakey v. Cont’l Airlines, 751 A.2d 538 (N.J. 2000)). 
98  See Comisky & Diamond, supra note 3, at 387. 
99  See, e.g., Owens v. Morgan Stanley & Co., No. 96 CIV. 9747, 1997 WL 403454, at 2 (S.D.N.Y. July 17, 1997) (describing 
one e-mail that was sent while at work); Strauss v. Microsoft Corp., 91 CIV. 5928, 1995 WL 326492, at 4–5 (S.D.N.Y. 
June 1, 1995) (describing the e-mails from a supervisor to employees in the office).  
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there are no other harassing activities taking place at the actual workplace. Is this conduct 
for which an employer is liable? Under the Fifth Circuit’s test, a claim like this is unlikely 
to succeed because there is no hostility that is occurring in the workplace.100 The Seventh 
Circuit would likely consider these actions to be harassment but would still require the 
plaintiff to prove that there are consequences in the workplace.101 So if a plaintiff cannot 
show any type of harassment or repercussions at work, the claim may be barred. Finally, 
the Sixth Circuit may only find that there is employer liability if the harasser and the 
harassed have to work “in proximity” together.102 In Duggins v. Steak N’ Shake, Inc., the 
Sixth Circuit found that even though both the plaintiff and her alleged rapist were 
employees of Steak N’ Shake, because they never worked at the same restaurant and he 
never managed her, it was not a hostile work environment.103 Under this test, if the 
harassment occurs between two individuals who do not see each other at work (for 
example, they work in two different offices in the same city), this claim may be barred as 
well. 
If this claim is not successful, then the employee is unprotected in this situation, 
and yet, it is clear that the employee is suffering from some type of sexual harassment. 
Because the location matters so much, traditional sexual-harassment law does not clearly 
protect those who are victimized far from work, even though the work relationship is 
central to the harassment. 
 
ii.  The Employer Notice Problem  
Another potential difference for cases involving sexual harassment and BYOD 
devices is the limitations employers may have on electronic monitoring of those dual-
purpose devices. Employers are still able to monitor BYOD devices because they can require 
employee consent to monitoring as a prerequisite for participation in the program.104 
However, employees tend to be leery of their employer’s ability to monitor them. A 2012 
Harris Poll found that 82 percent of employees think it is an invasion of privacy if the 
employer can track them, for example, through a smartphone’s GPS capabilities; 76 percent 
                                                          
100  See Part II-A; see also Glowacki, supra note 48, at 356–58 (discussing the Fifth Circuit’s test as requiring harassment 
to affect the work environment, but not considering behavior that occurred outside the workplace in Gowesky v. 
Singing River Hosp. Sys., 321 F.3d 503 (5th Cir. 2003)). 
101  See supra Part II; see also Garmager, supra note 49, at 1076. 
102  Glowacki, supra note 48, at 360 (citing Duggins v. Steak n’ Shake, Inc., 3 F. App’x 302, 311 (6th Cir. 2001)). 
103  3 F. App’x 302, 311 (6th Cir. 2001). The alleged rape took place at a non-work event off-site. 
104  See, e.g., Comisky & Diamond, supra note 3, at 408. An interesting question is whether an employer could escape 
liability by contracting only for certain applications, programs, or capabilities on a BYOD device, thus considering 
all other programs “personal” and not having to monitor them. For example, if a company only allows email on 
personal smartphones, but expressly does not allow workplace texting on the phone, then could they be liable for 
harassment via text? Given that companies often monitor for multiple reasons, primarily to make sure no sensitive 
information (like trade secrets) are being shared, it seems unlikely that companies would limit their own ability to 
monitor employees in an attempt to avoid liability, however, this is a question that warrants further exploration, but 
is beyond the scope of this paper. 
Indiana Journal of Law & Social Equality  Volume 4, Issue 2 
205 
of employees would not allow their employer to access applications they have installed on 
a personal device; and 82 percent of employees are concerned about employers tracking 
their internet usage while not at work.105 
There are some current legal restrictions to what an employer can access on the 
BYOD device as well. For example, employers have been held liable for “inappropriately 
accessing and using information obtained from employee social media and electronic 
communication accounts.”106 And there are some limited protections for employee privacy 
in the form of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act and the Electronic Communications 
Privacy Act of 1986;107 however, as discussed in Part II, these boundaries are murky and may 
not apply to the technology BYOD devices use. 
Ultimately, what an employer can monitor on BYOD devices will come down to the 
legal limitations, but that is not to say that employee concerns over privacy will not factor 
into what the company policy allows. The results of the Harris Poll show that employers 
having too much access on personal devices is a serious concern of employees.108 Given this 
concern, employers may face difficulty with policies that are too broad and allow for too 
much access, and so they may be limited by their own policies as well.  
Either way, employers will not have unfettered access to personal devices. This 
limited access may provide employers with immunity from sexual-harassment suits 
because they may lack notice of the sexual harassment. An employer cannot escape liability 
for harassment if the employer knew about it and failed to take corrective and preventative 
measures.109 With electronic monitoring, employers with the technological capacity could 
constantly be checking for electronic harassment by flagging emails or other 
correspondence that include problematic words; some scholars have argued that having 
the capability to monitor employees and not doing so should prevent the employer from 
using the Ellerth and Fargher affirmative defense at all.110 Thus, with electronic monitoring, 
employers potentially have a greater chance of being on notice of this behavior; the 
difference between liability and no liability, then, is whether or not the company acts to 
rectify the situation. But if employers cannot monitor all of what is happening on a BYOD 
device, then they may be less likely to be on notice of problematic behavior, making it 
slightly easier for companies to avoid liability due to the limitations of electronic 
monitoring on BYOD devices.  
                                                          
105  Harris Survey Exposes Concerns About Employee Privacy for BYOD, PR NEWSWIRE (Sept. 27, 2012), 
http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/harris-survey-exposes-concerns-about-employee-privacy-for-byod-
171520251.html. 
106  Comisky & Diamond, supra note 3, at 403. 
107  See supra Part II-B for a discussion on these two acts. 
108  Harris Survey Exposes Concerns About Employee Privacy for BYOD, supra note 105. 
109  Burke, supra note 19, at 599. 
110  Garrie, supra note 60. 
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It should be noted that, when faced with the issue, courts have not imposed a duty 
on employers to monitor employees electronically. But courts will still hold employers 
liable for harassment. For example, in Blakey, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that an 
employer was liable for messages posted on an electronic bulletin board.111 Part of the 
decision in Blakey was that the forum was so closely intertwined with the workplace that it 
was an extension of the workplace.112 The other part of the decision rested on whether an 
employer has notice of the harassment.113 Still, the court “explicitly stated” that an employer 
has no duty to monitor employee e-mail.114 
 
iii.  The (Lack of a) First Amendment Problem 
 As discussed in Part II, the First Amendment protections to what employees say is 
actually quite limited, and as such, has a smaller role to play in the analysis of a BYOD 
policy than many employees may believe. If a private employer can prove that they have a 
legitimate business interest in curtailing an employee’s off-the-clock speech, then they can 
limit it.115 This means that if an employer became aware of inappropriate or harassing 
speech made on a BYOD device, it would be able to take action, given its interest in 
complying with Title VII.  
 
IV.  POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS FOR THE PROBLEMS CREATED IN APPLYING TRADITIONAL 
SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW TO CLAIMS INVOLVING BYOD DEVICES 
 As sexual harassment suits have stretched Title VII’s protection against sex 
discrimination to its limit (and perhaps beyond),116 that stretching only continues with the 
introduction of BYOD policies, which highlight how the state of the law focuses on location 
and notice, potentially leaving victims without recourse. The uniqueness of these policies 
requires an exploration of possible alternatives, which include both finding ways to change 
the law so as to clearly hold the employer liable, or removing the location (and employer 
liability) from the equation completely, and focusing on other forms of remedy for victims. 
 
A. Substantial Benefits Test 
One solution that has been offered to deal with the proliferation of employee social 
media use is a “substantial benefits” test.117 This test is a modification of the current sexual-
                                                          
111  Blakey v. Con’t Airlines, 751 A.2d 538, 542–43 (N.J. 2000). 
112  Id. at 551–52 (the test for determining if something is “sufficiently integrated” is whether the company received an 
economic benefit from the site). 
113  Id. at 543. 
114  Higgins, supra note 9, at 168. 
115  Abril et al., supra note 79, 94–95 (discussing how the lack of statutes governing the intersection between social media 
and work means that U.S. employers can legally fire employees for information posted on social media sites, even 
while off-duty). 
116  See Bernstein, supra note 6, at 1250. 
117  Gelms, supra note 2, at 251. 
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harassment law. Jeremy Gelms argued that if an employer obtains a substantial benefit from 
the social media that the employee used, then harassment that occurs on that medium 
should be considered as part of the totality of the circumstances under traditional sexual-
harassment law.118 Gelms relied on the New Jersey Supreme Court’s decision in Blakey to 
articulate when an employer is deemed to receive a substantial benefit.119 The test depends 
on whether “the social media was sufficiently integrated into the employer’s business 
operations,” including whether or not employees could access company information on 
social media, whether employees are communicating about company business or working 
on a work-related project, and how many employees were using the social media forum.120 
Using this modified, traditional sexual-harassment law, a court could examine whether the 
employer received a substantial benefit from the device. If so, then any harassment that 
occurred through the device could be considered in the totality of the circumstances and 
factored into the hostile-workplace claim. 
Social media and BYOD devices are similar in several ways: both can be accessed 
from work or home, both usually contain very personal information, and both can also be 
used as a business tool.121 A substantial benefits test, modifying the current sexual-
harassment law, solves both the location and ownership problems identified with BYOD 
devices because it does not matter where, when, or how the harassing content was posted. 
Use of this test would also solve the circuit split on including off-the-clock harassment in 
the totality of the circumstances test for a hostile environment because it would 
standardize when the court considers activity on a BYOD device during a sexual-
harassment suit. 
Even though this approach would provide a clear remedy for victims, it does have 
some major drawbacks. First, it is probable that courts would always find that employers 
got substantial benefits from a BYOD device, because one of the main reasons behind 
implementing this policy is an economic benefit to employers.122 Second, these benefits 
would likely incentivize employers to heavily monitor all of the activity on a BYOD device. 
Intrusive monitoring on a dual-purpose device may cause some employees to refuse to use 
a BYOD device or give rise to claims that the monitoring restricts First Amendment 
speech.123 Additionally, smaller employers may not be capable, financially or 
technologically, of monitoring their employees’ phones. These drawbacks make this 
solution unlikely to succeed. 
 
                                                          
118  Id. 
119  Id. at 273. 
120  Id.  
121  Id. at 264–67. 
122  Comisky & Diamond, supra note 3, at 386. 
123  See supra text accompanying notes 115–16 (discussing the fact that First Amendment claims are likely to be 
unsuccessful).  
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B. Employers are Not Liable 
One forceful critique of current sexual-harassment law is that it only recognizes 
sexual harassment that “occurs in certain protected settings,”124 one of which is the 
employment setting. But the problems discussed in this paper demonstrate that the 
expansion of electronic communications has resulted in harassment that is not limited to 
one protected setting. Nor are the repercussions limited to the workplace.125 It begs the 
question, is focusing on employer liability the best way to analyze sexual-harassment 
claims? This section explores a few alternatives to protecting individuals who are sexually 
harassed without going through Title VII. This Note argues that the proliferation of 
technology has changed how work is done, and so tying sexual-harassment law to a certain 
physical location leaves victims of sexual harassment exposed and without remedy. The 
following potential solutions recognize that location is less important and change how 
victims could fight back against harassment.  
 
i.  Civil Tort Remedies 
 There is a distinction between the harm caused by harassment and the context of 
the harassment.126 Because sexual-harassment law is focused on Title VII as the solution to 
workplace sexual harassment, some have argued that it places too much emphasis on the 
context of the sexual harassment rather than the dignitary harm the harassment causes.127 
For example, rather than providing a solution to anyone who is a victim of sexual 
harassment, solutions are only available to those who are victimized within a certain 
context: work. One solution is to step back from Title VII litigation for sexual harassment 
and instead use common-law tort actions.128 
Under the common-law tort approach, claims that “can be said to injure an 
individual’s dignitary interests” are actionable.129 While there are several torts that could 
potentially be relied upon in pursuing a tort claim against a harasser—like battery, assault, 
invasion of privacy, or intentional infliction of emotional distress—all of the actions 
recognize the inherent human dignity in the harassed individual.130 This is appealing 
because it recognizes that the dignitary interests of the harassed individual are not simply 
affected while at work—for example, if employees receive messages on the weekends sent 
through BYOD devices. 
                                                          
124  Mary Anne Franks, Sexual Harassment 2.0, 71 MD. L. REV. 655, 657 (2012). 
125  See Kathryn Abrams, The Constitution of Women, 48 ALA. L. REV. 861, 879 (1997) (discussing how sexualizing women 
can “poison relations in the workplace as well in more intimate contexts”). 
126  See Ehrenreich, supra note 35, at 3. 
127  Id. at 4. 
128  Id. 
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130  Id. at 22–23. 
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Monetarily, it may be appealing to plaintiffs as well, as there are caps on what some 
federal employees can get from employers under Title VII.131 Additionally, in 1976, the 
Supreme Court held that Title VII was “an exclusive, preemptive administrative and judicial 
scheme for the redress of federal employment discrimination.”132 This has led to a circuit 
split on whether Title VII preempts torts that arise out of the same set of facts as the Title 
VII suit.133 If civil torts, as opposed to Title VII, were adopted as the method for dealing with 
sexual harassment, then federal employees in particular would be relieved of the financial 
limits involved in Title VII litigation, which may make it a more attractive option for 
plaintiffs. 
Using common-law torts as the primary method of dealing with sexual harassment 
has several benefits, the most important being the untying of harassment to a location, 
since modern technology allows for harassment to occur anywhere and anytime. First, as 
discussed above, it would be better for federal employees who are victims of sexual 
harassment. Second, this approach recognizes that sexual harassment can cause harm to 
an individual’s dignity without requiring a hostile workplace, while solving the location 
problem caused by BYOD devices. Additionally, under civil torts, the plaintiffs may sue the 
perpetrator of the harassment rather than the employer. An employer would likely still 
monitor BYOD devices for business-related information, like exposure of trade secrets, but 
the company would be less concerned about monitoring purely personal e-mails or texts, 
giving individuals more privacy. This could solve the concerns about overly-intrusive 
electronic monitoring and its accompanying privacy concerns. And if the company is less 
concerned about what people say, there is little chance of employees making a First 
Amendment chilling-speech argument. 
But plaintiffs would likely still find it financially attractive to sue employers under 
the tort doctrine of respondeat superior, if the plaintiff can prove the harasser was acting 
within the scope of employment.134 This means that employers are still going to be 
incentivized to monitor employees, and so the problems of monitoring and free speech 
may not be solved after all. Still, what the plaintiff would have to prove for a tort would 
revolve less around the context of the harassment (whether there was an impact on the 
work environment) and focus more on the harm that matters to the plaintiff—the dignitary 
harm. 
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APP. ADVOC. 310, 329 (2014) (discussing the Civil Rights Act of 1991, administrative requirements, statute of 
limitations, and other caps on recovery). 
132  Brown v. Gen. Serv. Admin., 425 U.S. 820, 828–29 (1976). 
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ii.  Stalking Laws 
In contrast to the civil-tort remedy, stalking laws may provide an alternative 
criminal recourse for victims of sexual harassment. For those who are victimized by BYOD 
device users outside of the workplace, this may be a very beneficial tool, because it focuses 
on the harassment rather than the impact on the workplace.135 This would be a very limited 
solution because stalking laws focus on a very specific type of harassment and definitions 
of stalking vary from state to state,136 though there is also a federal statute that prohibits 
stalking under the Interstate Commerce Clause.137 Stalking laws would likely not 
encompass behavior that, under traditional sexual-harassment law, has been shown to 
create a hostile work environment, such as repeated passing comments that disparage 
women in general.138 However, these statutes usually include engaging in “harassing or 
threatening behavior . . . such as following a person, appearing at a person’s home or place 
of business, making harassing phone calls, leaving written messages or objects, or 
vandalizing a person’s property.”139 So it may be a solution if the harassment is “sufficiently 
repetitive, obsessive, and frightening.”140 It is possible to envision, then, a type of sexual 
harassment that occurs at work and involves repeated, specific threats that may qualify 
under stalking laws. 
Taking responsibility off of the employer and putting it onto the harasser/stalker 
eliminates the employer monitoring issues discussed earlier and the location issue of the 
BYOD device. But relying on stalking laws has serious downsides for the average employee 
who is harassed at work. These statutes may only be effective for the most serious cases of 
sexual harassment. Additionally, stalking tends to conjure up the image of a stalker being 
in a place they should not be. In an employment context, if both the harassed and the 
harasser were employed at the same company, the harasser would have every right to be in 
the same building as the harassed person; it may be difficult to prove claims of stalking, 
meaning that some claims of harassment may go without repercussions. This would not be 
a problem, though, if a state defines contact to include electronic contact. Still, relying 
solely on stalking laws, as an alternative to Title VII, is dangerous and leaves too many 
victims without protection. 
 
 
                                                          
135  See Robert E. Rodes, Jr., On Law and Chastity, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 643, 702 (2001). 
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137  18 U.S.C. § 2261(b)(6) (2012). 
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C. Specific Federal Statutes and Federal Agencies That Can Address Sexual Harassment 
The last alternative to traditional sexual-harassment law that this Note will address 
is the creation of specific federal statutes to address each tension in traditional sexual-
harassment law illustrated when applying it to BYOD devices. This would be a modification 
of traditional sexual-harassment law and is the best alternative to existing law.  
There are two types of statutes that Congress could enact to address the issues of 
traditional sexual-harassment law that arise when applied to BYOD devices. First, Congress 
could enact a statute that addresses the location issue. Courts have struggled with 
pinpointing when an employer should be liable for off-location harassment since the 
location of the harassment is not addressed in Title VII.141 A statute that defined the 
location for the sex discrimination, however Congress chose to set those boundaries, would 
clarify whether employers are liable for harassment that occurs on BYOD devices outside 
of the workplace. Having clear boundaries is important for establishing clear remedies. If 
an employer is clear about its legal liability, it is more likely to provide more effective 
internal solutions in addition to a victim’s legal rights. 
Second, Congress could also create statutes that establish the limits of employer 
electronic monitoring; currently there is no federal comprehensive scheme on this issue.142 
As discussed in Part II, the only applicable statutes that address this issue are the CFAA 
and the ECPA, but scholars have noted that these provisions do not realistically cover the 
technological transmissions that employees may be using to sexually harass other 
employees.143 Establishing the limits of this type of monitoring also would establish the 
limits on the particular sexually harassing behavior on BYOD devices that can reasonably 
be expected to give employers notice. This would simultaneously eliminate any First 
Amendment chilling-speech claims, because the employee would be expected to know 
what programs and types of communications on the BYOD device are protected from 
monitoring. Again, the current legal standard is that an employer must only establish a 
legitimate business interest to curtail employee speech on the parts of the device that are 
being monitored.144 
A related, but different, solution is for Congress to create federal statutes that would 
move away from the traditional sexual-harassment law rather than modifying it. One such 
possibility is moving liability for this type of harassment away from the work world and 
towards the virtual world. Congress could enact statutes that hold Internet Service 
Providers (ISPs) liable for content that creates a hostile environment online. ISPs have been 
defined as entities that host websites and entities that host message boards, auction sites, 
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142  Garrie, supra note 60, at 245 n.94. 
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e-mail listservs, and Internet dating sites.145 This approach has been advocated by at least 
one author searching for a legal recourse when teenagers use the Internet to bully each 
other.146 However, under current law, this approach is not a possibility because of § 230 of 
the Communications Decency Act (CDA), which has been interpreted to give ISPs 
immunity from those claims.147 The § 230 defense is that ISPs are not liable for content 
from third parties.148 If Congress abrogated this defense, then ISPs could replace employers 
as the party liable for sexual harassment that occurs through harassing emails or posts on 
social media. There are some recent court decisions that indicate that courts “may be ready 
to rethink” the blanket immunity of § 230,149 and perhaps it is time that Congress does so 
too. However, this would create great administrative problems: how is a company like 
Comcast supposed to monitor each of its users and quickly flag harassing activity? Because 
of the enormity of the administrative challenges, this solution is not likely to be successful. 
With respect to federal agencies, a final solution is to have the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) each 
regulate the Internet and other online communication issues;150 this would also take the 
liability out of the hands of the employers. The FCC was established in 1934 and regulates 
“interstate and international communications by radio, television, wire, satellite, and 
cable.”151 The FTC has a charter to “protect consumers and police anticompetitive 
practices.”152 Scholars have argued that the FTC and the FCC should “jointly develop general 
privacy principles” for users of communication technologies.153 The flip side of the legal 
ability for these Commissions to create privacy rules is the power to create rules that would 
establish liability when the technologies are abused and used to sexually harass individuals.  
Because new technologies and electronic communications are increasingly 
interconnected and increasingly ubiquitous, liability for the abuse of these technologies 
could be considered a step removed from a specific context (for example, the workplace) 
or a specific technology (for example, an e-mail). However, the same administrative issues 
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that exist in creating ISP liability exist in having these federal agencies oversee harassment 
and so is also unlikely to succeed. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 BYOD policies and devices test the strength of workplace sexual-harassment law 
because they exist at the tensions between location and ownership, privacy, and First 
Amendment concerns. As there has yet to be an explicit case concerning BYOD devices, 
policies, and sexual harassment to reach the courts, it is unclear how the courts will address 
those claims and whether any of those issues will be so problematic as to prevent employers 
from being liable under Title VII, thus leaving sexual-harassment victims without legal 
remedies for their harassment.  
 Although there are numerous problems with the current state of the law, the offered 
solutions to these problems are not without their own challenges, either in adoption or in 
practice. For example, if traditional sexual-harassment law is modified by the substantial 
benefits test, courts will likely always find that an employer gets substantial benefits from 
a BYOD device, meaning it is unlikely to be adopted because it would make employers de 
facto liable for any sexual harassment that occurs on the device. On the other hand, relying 
on civil-tort remedies, rather than traditional sexual-harassment law, may end up just 
being a different way to reach employer liability, which means employee monitoring would 
remain an issue. Similarly, relying solely on stalking laws might leave some victims without 
remedy (if the behavior does not meet the elements of the stalking statute), and the 
employer would not be liable. Using federal agencies or transferring liability to the Internet 
provider provides incredibly complex administrative problems, and so is also unlikely to be 
a successful solution to the problem. 
 The most straightforward solution, it seems, is for Congress to recognize that there 
are limits to the current Title VII protections that may leave some victims without a remedy 
and to enact specific statutes that address those limitations. If Congress addresses the issue, 
then courts can have clear lines on employer liability under Title VII and can address BYOD 
devices within those lines. Additionally, keeping liability through Title VII (as opposed to 
relying on civil torts, or creating liability for ISPs) has the benefit of keeping the long history 
of legislation and jurisprudence relating to Title VII relevant rather than attempting to start 
from a clean slate. Finally, Congress-enacted statutes may be the best approach to reconcile 
the impact sexual harassment has both on the employee and on the employer. Employers 
are economically disadvantaged when the work environment is hostile.154 By keeping 
responsibility on employers, while defining limits of this liability, employers can work 
within well-defined legal bounds regarding location, employee privacy, and First 
                                                          
154  See Krista J. Schoenheider, A Theory of Tort Liability for Sexual Harassment in the Workplace, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1461, 
1464–65 (1986); McGraw, supra note 83, at 502. 
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Amendment issues to run an efficient workplace that minimizes the harms of sexual 
harassment.  
With the increasing integration of technology into our lives, we need to make sure 
we are updating our protections so that the vulnerable are not left without protection. 
Asking Congress to create specific federal statutes addressing the weakness in Title VII 
legislation is the best solution to ensure remedies are available to victims of workplace 
sexual harassment, regardless of where, when, or how harassing messages are 
communicated.  
 
